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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
ROBERT BRUCE EVANS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant, ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
12942 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Robert Bruce Evans, 
appeals from the ruling dismissing his 
appeal from the Provo City Court con-
viction of Driving Under the Influence 
of Intoxicating Liquor, and from the 
ruling denying appellant's motion to 
reinstate same in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, 
2 
State of Utah, the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorensen, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Robert Bruce Evans, appellant, was 
charged with Driving Under the Influenct 
of Intoxicating Liquor in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., Se.c. 41-6-44 (1953), an~ 
tried and convicted by the Provo City 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah. Sub-
sequent to said conviction, appellant 
caused to be served and filed his Notice 
of Appeal and Undertaking, together witL 
cash security in the Provo City Court. 
Such appeal was dismissed and the case 
remanded back to the city court by orde1 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court 11 
and for Utah County, Judge Allen B. 
Sorensen, presiding. Appellant's 
motion to reinstate the appeal was 
similarly denied. 
RELIEF SOVGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests 
3 
that the rulings of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court be reversed and that said 
court be instructed to entertain appellant's 
appeal with a de novo trial as provided by 
law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 18th day of February, 1972, 
appellant was arrested and charged with 
Driving Under the Influence of Intoxic-
ating Liquor. Appellant was tried and 
convicted before the Provo City Court. 
Judgment was entered in the city court 
March 29, 1972; appellant receiving a 
fine of $200.00, together with a suspens-
ion of his driving privileges. On the 
28th day of April, 1972, appellant, 
through his counsel, mailed copies of 
his Notice of Appeal to the Clerk of the 
Provo City Court and to the Utah County 
Attorney, both at Provo, Utah, by deposit-
ing same in the U.S. mails, postage pre-
paid. The Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Utah County, on the 9th day of 
4 
May, 1972, upon its own motion, dismissed 
appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdicl-
ion. On the 19th day of May, 1972, sub-
sequent to a hearing on the matter, app-
ellant 1 s motion to reinstate the appeal 
was similarly denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THAT APPELLANT 1 S APPEAL FROM THE PR0\111 
CITY COURT TO THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICl 
COURT WAS TIMELY TAKEN WITHIN THE PERIOD 
PROVIDED BY LAW 
Appellant's right of appeal from a 
criminal conviction entered in a city or 
justice court is statutory in nature, the 
pertinent portions of Utah Code Ann., 
(1953), being as follows: 
1 
Sec. 77-57-38 
Any defendant in a criminal 
1 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-5-14 (1953) 
has been so construed as' to make rules of 
appeal from justice courts applicable to 
appeals from city courts. Levy v. Distri0_ 
Court of Salt Lake County, 61 Utah 519. 
Following statutes should be read accord-
ingly. 
5 
action tried before a justice 
of the peace may appeal from 
the final judgment therein to 
the district court of the county 
where the court of such justice 
is held, at any time within thirty 
days from the time of the entry of 
the judgment. (Emphasis added) 
Sec. 77-57-39 
The appeal shall be taken 
by giving notice .... 
Sec. 77-57-40 
Notice of appeal shall be 
filed with the justice, and a 
copy thereof shall be served on 
the county or prosecuting attorney. 
The sole question presented herein 
for this Court's consideration may be 
succinctly stated: Was the appeal taken 
from the city court to the district court 
taken in time? To perfect such an appeal, 
the legislative enactments above enumer-
ated simply require that, within thirty 
days, notice be served upon the county 
attorney and filed with the court from 
which the appeal is taken. 
While the Code of Criminal Procedure 
6 
is silent as to when service upon an 
adverse party is effective, the general 
proposition of law, as expressed in the 
decisions of this Court, has long been 
that service by mail is complete upon 
mailing. This Court so found in Green-
wood v. Bramel, 54 Utah 1 (1918); a civil 
matter involving strikingly similar cir-
cumstances. Rule S(b)(l), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, follows this policy in 
providing, "Service by mail is complete 
upon mailing. 11 The rules governing appeal· 
from city and justice courts being ident-
ical with respect to both civil and crim-
inal matters, the policy embodied in Rule 
S{b){l) should govern the instant case. 
The record clearly discloses that the 
notices were mailed the thirtieth day 
from the rendition of the judgment in 
2 
the city court. 
2 See Chipman v. District Court of 
Fourth Judicial District, 44 Utah 201 
(1914). 
7 
Though admittedly, appellant's Notice 
of Appeal was not actually filed in the 
city court on or within the thirtieth day, 
excluding the first, from the rendition of 
judgment, Utah Code Ann., Sec. 68-3-7 (1953) 
provides: 
The time in which any act 
provided by law is to be done is 
computed by excluding the first 
day and including the last, unless 
the last is a holiday, and then it 
also is excluded. (Emphasis added) 
Applying this formula to the case at bar, 
the last, or thirtieth day (the date of 
mailing notices) fell on the 28th day of 
April, 1972, a Friday, and as this Court 
may judically note, a legal holiday; to-
3 wit, Arbor Day. This being the case, 
3 Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 
7 3 Utah 212 (Court judically noted that 
date fell on a certain day of week). 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 63-13-2(2) (1971 
Supp) provides: 
For the period beginning 
with January 1, 1971, the follow-
ing named days are legal holidays 
in this state: ... the last Friday 
in April [April 28, 1972], called 
Arbor Day; ... 
8 
the next regular business day upon which 
appellant's Notice of Appeal could have 
been filed was the following Monday, May 
1st; the date upon which it actually was 
filed. 4 
4 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 68-3-8 (1953) 
similarly allows: 
Whenever any act . . . LS 
appointed by law . . . to be P'~ r-
formed upon a particular day, 
which day falls upon a hoJiday, 
such act may be performed upon 
the next succeeding business day 
with the same effect as if it had 
been performed upon the day appoint-
ed. 
Sections 68-3-7 and 68-3-8 are substant-
ially restated in Rule 6, Utah Rules of 
Civ i_l Procedurt~, which itself operates 
with respect to not only the Rules, but 
also, "any applj cable stat,ute." 
9 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the basis of the foregoing, it 
should be clear that all actions of 
appellant requisite to the perfection of 
his appeal were taken within the time 
duly allowed by law. Accordingly, juris-
diction was established over such appeal 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court and 
it was error for said court to decline to 
exercise same. Appellant respectfully 
requests, therefor, that the rulings of 
the district court be reversed and that 
the district court be instructed to 
entertain the appeal. 
DAVID J. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Your Aff iant does state under oath that 
the statement made in Respondent Brief pages 
26, 27 and 29 as to the alleged remodeling 
is false and that the installation of said 
door did not in any way involve any extension 
of the brickwalls, roof or floor beyond the 
original front entrance of the premises in 
any way whatsoever. 
Further Affiant sayeth naught. 
?? ·. . - . CJU~e{J(~~ 
- FLORENCE L. DAV NPORT 
Af f iant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this~ 
day of December, 1972. 
My Commission Expires: 
12-3-75 
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